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Abstract
We examine the impact of discrimination on labour market perfor-
mance when workers are subject to a risk of losing skills during the expe-
rience of unemployment. Within a search and matching model, we show
that all natives and immigrants are a¤ected by discrimination. Discrimi-
nation in one sector has positive spillovers, inducing employment increases
in the other sector. Discrimination may induce immigrants to train more
or less than natives, depending on the sector where it is present. Wel-
fare tends to be most negatively a¤ected by discrimination among high-
productivity workers.
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1 Introduction
According to the OECD Employment Outlook 2008, labour market discrimina-
tion i.e. the unequal treatment of equally productive individuals only because
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they belong to a specic group is still a crucial factor inating disparities in
employment and the quality of job opportunities in many countries. Evidence
presented in that study suggests that workers from ethnic minorities have to
search 40% to 50% longer than individuals with the same characteristics but
belonging to majority groups before they receive a job o¤er, which renders them
much more vulnerable to the risk of long-term unemployment.
The purpose of this paper is to study the e¤ects of the discrimination of
immigrants on labour market performance taking into account that workers risk
losing skills during an unemployment spell causing long-term unemployment.1
The novelty of the paper is to consider a double e¤ect of discrimination: it
a¤ects the skills of immigrants through skill loss and the decision to train.
Several studies have found that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
had e¤ects on the USA labour market outcomes of individuals with country of
origin proles similar to those of the terrorists.2 Zussman (2010) nds that
ethnic bias in judicial decision-making in Israel depends on the number of fa-
talities from recent attacks in the vicinity of the court but not in other places.
Discrimination can be a reaction to external events where none of the parts
are involved. We model discrimination as a capricious rejection of immigrant
applicants. Negative events, such as unexpected violent political developments,
trigger these rejections. An immigrant worker does not get a job o¤er after a
trigger event, while a native worker does.
The impact of discrimination is amplied if workers are subject to the risk
of losing skills during the experience of unemployment. Discrimination may
not only result in natives and immigrants getting di¤erent pay for the same
work, but also in workers with similar skill levels ending up in di¤erent occu-
pations. Unemployed workers who lose their skills can only search for jobs in
the low-productivity sector.3 Low-skilled workers may regain their skills by
accumulating work experience or by training when unemployed. This issue has
previously been neglected in the theoretical literature.
Empirical evidence supports the fact that employment below an individuals
qualications and loss of skill are important issues to consider. First, Arai
et al (2000) show that the probability of getting a qualied job is 70% lower
for immigrants to Sweden born in Eastern Europe, Asia or Africa and 50%
1Larsen (2001) has a similar set-up, but does not distinguish by origin.
2Davila and Mora (2005), Kaushal, Kaestner, and Reimers (2007), Rabby (2009) etc.
3For simplicity, we disregard self-employment.
2
lower for those born in Latin America, than for similar natives. Immigrants
are overrepresented in only three out of 29 occupations, all of which require no
education or training. Second, Reitz (2001) shows that the under-utilization of
immigrant skills is signicant in Canada. Finally, Nielsen et al (2004) show that
a large fraction of the wage gap between immigrants and natives in Denmark
would disappear if only immigrants could accumulate work experience.
The model is along the lines of Pissarides (2000) combined with an endoge-
nous skill choice. Acemoglu (2001) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002) model the
choice of skill requirements by rms, while we consider the decision taken by
workers. In Burdett and Smith (2002) and Aricó (2009), workers with hetero-
geneous training costs take an investment decision in skill-acquisition before
entering the job market, while we allow for training every time a worker loses
skills. None of these papers study the issue of discrimination.
First, we present a model, where the training decision is optimally taken
by the workers. We then abandon endogenous training in order to allow for
on-the-job training, so that skills which have been lost while being unemployed
can be regained while working.
When training is endogenous we obtain the following results. Because of
discrimination, immigrants su¤er higher unemployment rates, despite receiving
lower wages. By being unemployed more often, skilled immigrants are sub-
ject to a higher risk of losing skills and, consequently, more often end up in
low-productivity jobs. The e¤ect is strongest for the a¤ected immigrants, but
other workers are also a¤ected. Discrimination in the high skilled sector fur-
thermore implies that fewer low skilled workers train. This negative impact
on training is higher for immigrants than for natives as the latter group is not
directly negatively a¤ected by discrimination. This impact, together with the
reduced vacancy supply directed towards high skilled workers, implies that the
proportion of skilled workers in the economy falls. The negative impact is again
stronger for immigrants than for natives. When discrimination is instead fac-
ing low skilled workers, they train more. The e¤ect is stronger for immigrants
than for natives due to the direct e¤ect from discrimination. The proportion
of skilled immigrants is then higher than the proportion of skilled natives, de-
spite the fact that more immigrants tend to become low skilled workers, that
is, more of them loses skills. This is the case as immigrants train to counteract
the negative impact through discrimination.
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The model with exogenous training and on-the-job training delivers simi-
lar results. Discrimination in one sector reduces wages of all workers and in-
creases the unemployment rate of natives in the same sector, but it actually
improves employment perspectives in the other sector. When low-productivity
immigrants are discriminated against, all skilled workers accept lower wages to
increase their employment chances and avoid the risk of losing skills through
the experience of unemployment, thus reducing the rate of unemployment in
the sector.
Considering welfare, the reduction in vacancy supply induced by discrimina-
tion has a negative e¤ect on welfare and we tend to see the strongest negative
e¤ect when discrimination is prevalent in the high-productivity sector.
The paper is organized as follows. The model with endogenous training is
set up in Section 2. Section 3 shows the e¤ect of an increase in discrimination
when training is endogenous. Section 4 presents the model where training is
exogenous. Section 5 considers the e¤ect of an increase in discrimination in
this alternative model. Section 6 considers welfare and Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Endogenous training
We develop a model with two types of agents, workers and rms. Both work-
ers and rms are risk-neutral and innitely-lived and have a common discount
rate. Workers are either employed, unemployed or training. The economy is
populated by native and immigrant workers. The share of native workers, n, is
exogenously given. The labour force is normalized to one.
To hire a worker, a rm maintains an open vacancy at ow cost k. Free
entry drives the discounted prots of creating a vacancy to zero. The econ-
omy is divided into two sectors. Firms in sector h require skilled workers with
high productivity, yh; while rms in sector l employ low-skilled workers with
productivity yl < yh. The skills of workers is assumed to be observable.
We model discrimination as a capricious rejection of immigrant applicants.
If a negative external event, such as media picturing immigrants in a negative
manner, occurs after a vacancy was opened but previous to a match with an
immigrant worker, the immigrant is not o¤ered a job. Discrimination then
implies that immigrants face a lower probability of getting a job than natives.
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This occurs in a match with probability ds (s = h; l).4
For simplicity, we assume that all workers enter the labour market as skilled
workers.5 When unemployed, skilled workers lose their skills with probability
. If workers choose to engage in a training program, they regain their skills
once this program ceases.
2.1 Matching
Unemployed workers search for jobs in sector h or l; depending on their produc-
tivity level. Productivity is sector specic. We assume that the value of skilled
unemployment is higher than the value of unskilled employment, implying it is
not optimal for high-skilled workers to search for low-skilled jobs.6 The match-
ing function for sector s is assumed to have the functional form (vs)

(us)
1 
;
where vs is the sectorial vacancy rate and us is the unemployment rate in sector
s = h; l and 0 <  < 1.
The transition rate into employment for a native worker with productivity
s is given by fNs = f (s) = 

s ; s = h; l ; where s = vs=us captures sectorial
labour market tightness. As discrimination may disrupt a match, the immigrant
workers transition rates into employment are reduced relative to those of natives
to f Is = f (s) (1  ds) = s (1  ds) ; s = h; l. The ow arrival rate at which
vacant jobs become lled is qs = q (1=s) = 
 1
s ; s = h; l.
2.2 Workers
The present discounted value, PDV, of the unemployed skilled worker i of origin
J = N; I (natives or immigrants) is given by
UJih = f
J
h
 
W Jih   UJih

+ 
 
UJil   UJih

; J = N; I: (1)
At the ow arrival rate fJh ; the worker gets a job in the high-productivity
4An alternative is to model discrimination on exit, where an immigrant worker is either
red or forced to resign with a higher probability than a native worker. This alternative set
up delivers results similar to those in our model.
5Letting a proportion of natives and immigrants be low skilled to begin with does not
substantially modify the results.
6A su¢ cient condition requires that the di¤erence in productivities is su¢ ciently large yh >
(+)
4:5
yl, the risk of losing skills is not too low

4:5 >
(+)(+)
( )

and the unemployment
rate of high-skilled workers is not too high (uh < 0:10). See Appendix 1a for details. These
conditions are satised in the simulations below as long as ds is not too high (close to 0.5).
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sector and receives the value W Jih and at the rate , the worker loses skills and
becomes a low-skilled unemployed with the value of UJil :
UJil = f
J
il
 
W Jil   UJil

; J = N; I: (2)
The low-skilled unemployed worker i gets a job in the low-productivity sector
with probability per unit of time fJl : All parameters in the model are common
knowledge.
The present discounted value for the employed worker i;W Jis; s = h; l satises
W Jih = w
J
h + 
 
UJih  W Jih

; J = N; I; (3)
W Jil = w
J
l + 
 
UJil  W Jil

; J = N; I; (4)
where wJs is the wage in sector s and  is the rate of job separation, assumed
to be exogenous, identical for natives and immigrants and in both sectors.
A low skilled unemployed worker can choose to search for a job in the low
skilled sector or engage in a training process. We assume that the labour force
is heterogenous in the sense that some workers have higher cost of training
than others. To become high skilled both unemployed natives and immigrants
pay a per period cost c s U [0;C] which is specic to that opportunity. The
e¤ort needed by a worker to retrain in a particular opportunity depends on the
location and time where this training is provided, whether she is healthy or
sick, the family situation at that moment, etc. These factors vary over time.
Therefore, the fact that a worker chooses to train in one opportunity does not
imply that the worker also train next time her or she loses skills.
The worker compares the present discounted value of training, UJit (c), to the
value of being an unemployed high skilled worker. The value of training is given
by
UJit (c) = 
 
UJih   UJit (c)
  c; J = N; I;
where  is the exogenous rate by which the training programme ceases. When
this happens, the worker returns to the labour force as a skilled worker. The
marginal worker, with cost bcJ ; J = N; I, is indi¤erent between training and
remaining low skilled. The marginal worker thus satises the condition
UJil = U
J
it
 bcJ ; j = N; I: (5)
Workers with cost of training c < bcJ train, whereas workers with higher cost
do not.
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2.3 Firms
The present discounted value of a new vacancy in sector s is
Vs = qs
 
s
 
XNs   Vs

+ (1  s) (1  ds)
 
XIs   Vs

)
  k; s = h; l: (6)
s is the proportion of natives among the unemployed workers of produc-
tivity s and k is the per period cost of maintaining an open vacancy. With the
probability per unit of time, qss; the vacancy is lled by a native and provides
a value XNs to the rm, while the probability per unit of time of lling it with
an immigrant is qs (1  s) (1  ds) creating the value XIs :
The PDV of a job occupied by a worker of origin J; XJs satises
XJs = ys   wJs + 
 
Vs  XJs

; s = h; l and J = N; I: (7)
Using (6), (7), the matching function and assuming free entry, Vs = 0; we
obtain two equations to determine labour market tightness, s s = h; l :
gs = k
1 
s (+ )  s

ys   wNs
  (1  s) (1  ds) ys   wIs = 0: (8)
Discrimination causes, for given wages, a rms surplus to deteriorate when
there are many unemployed immigrants, that is, when s is small.
2.4 Equilibrium
Wages are determined by Nash Bargaining with a bargaining power equal to
one half, so that they are set to equalize the partiessurplus, W Js   UJs = XJs .
After substituting for eq. (2)-(7), this equalization implies
wJh =
1
2

yh + f
J
h
 
W Jih   UJih

+ 
 
UJil   UJih

; J = N; I; (9)
wJl =
1
2

yl + f
J
l
 
W Jil   UJil

; J = N; I: (10)
By inserting the PDVs from eq. (1)-(4) in eq. (9) and (10), we obtain:
wJh =
 
(+ ) (+ ) + fJh

yh +
fJl (+)
2(+)+fJl
yl 
2 (+ ) (+ ) + fJh
 ; J = N; I; (11)
wJl =
+  + fJl
2 (+ ) + fJl
yl; J = N; I: (12)
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Skilled workers receive higher wages than low-skilled workers, wJh > w
J
l ; J =
N; I as yh > yl. Wages received by skilled workers are a¤ected by the conditions
in the low productivity sector as the risk of losing skills implies that the low
productivity sector is one possible outside option. Wages received by skilled
immigrants are then directly a¤ected by discrimination in both the high and low
productivity sectors. Wages received by low skilled immigrants are only directly
a¤ected by discrimination in the low productivity sector. Skilled natives receive
higher wages than skilled immigrants as they have a higher transition rate out of
unemployment than skilled immigrants and thereby a better bargaining position.
Steady-state unemployment rates are derived by equalizing the ows into and
out of employment and the fact that eNl +e
N
h +
N
h +
N
l = n and e
I
l +e
I
h+
I
h+
I
l =
1   n; where eJs
 
Js

denotes employment (unemployment). We obtain the
following unemployment rates for immigrants and natives:
uJs = 
J
s =
 
eJs + 
J
s

= =
 
 + fJs

; s = h; l; J = N; I: (13)
Due to discrimination, immigrants face higher unemployment than natives
in both sectors, that is uIh=u
N
h > 1 and u
I
l =u
N
l > 1.
Replacing wages from equations (11) and (12), labour market tightness be-
comes
gh = k
1 
h (+ )  h
Nh   (1  h) (1  dh) 
Ih = 0;
gl = k
1 
l (+ )  l
(+ )
2 (+ ) + fl
yl   (1  l)
(1  dl) (+ )
(+ ) 2 + fl (1  dl)yl = 0;
where 
jh = (+ )
(+)yh  f
J
l yl
2(+)+fJ
l
2(+)(+)+fJh
. In order to determine the relative size
of labour market tightness in the high and low productivity sector, respectively,
we need to the determine the relative size of h and l.
Inserting equation (1) into the training equation (5) we obtain, after substi-
tuting for values and then wages, the equation determining the marginal worker
who trains, bcJ ; J = N; I :
bcJ = fJh yh    ( + ) fJh + 2 (+ ) ( + + ) fJl2(+)+fJl yl 
2 (+ ) (+ ) + fJh
 ; J = N; I:
(14)
A necessary condition for workers to train is that the right hand side is pos-
itive. For this to be the case, retraining progammes need to be short (implying
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a high rate by which a programme ceases, high ), the probability of getting
a high skilled job
 
fJh

needs to be relatively high and so does the di¤erence
in productivity achieved by training (yh   yl). The direct impact of discrimi-
nation facing high skilled workers on training is negative. When discrimination
is present in the low skilled sector, training becomes relatively more attractive
and bcJ increases. We furthermore note that any positive impact on the work-
erstransition rate in the high productivity sector, increases the attractiveness
of regaining skills through training, whereas the opposite holds for increases in
labour market tightness in the low productivity sector. The relative size of the
training fraction of natives versus immigrants depend on whether discrimination
is present among the high productivity workers or among the low productivity
workers.
The proportion of natives among the unemployment workers of productivity
s changes to
h =
Nh
Nh + 
I
h
=
1
1 +  (1 n)n
bcIbcN ; (15)
l =
1
1 +  (1 n)n
; (16)
where  = bcN [fh+(+)]+(+fl)bcI [fh(1 dh)+(+)]+(+fl(1 dl)) and hence the proportion of na-
tives among the skilled unemployed will be higher than the proportion of natives
among the low skilled unemployed if natives choose to train to a higher extent
than immigrants, that is, h > l if bcN > bcI .7
The proportion of skilled workers in the economy is:
Jh + e
J
h
nJ
=
bcJ   + fJh   bcJ  fJh +  (+ )+    + fJl  ; J = N; I;
where nN = n and nI = 1  n. We cannot immediately determine whether the
proportion of skilled workers is higher among natives than among immigrants.
Discrimination is going to a¤ect the proportion of skilled workers both directly
as well as indirectly through its impact on labour market tightness and training.
3 Higher Discrimination - Endogenous training
Any change in the labour market conditions a¤ects the bargaining positions
in the match. A weakening of the workers position results in acceptance of a
7See Appendix 2 for derivation.
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lower wage. This is the direct e¤ect of any change. There is a further indirect
e¤ect on all workers in the same sector. Firms o¤er fewer vacancies if the
chance of lling them falls, which reduces labour market tightness and thus, the
employment probability of a worker in the sector. The risk of losing skills and
the probability of regaining skills, implies that a change in one sector potentially
a¤ects the bargaining position of the workers in the other sector. The proofs
of the propositions follow from di¤erentiation of the appropriate expression(s).
We assume discrimination to be present in one sector at a time to improve
the transparency of the intuition. This is equivalent to assuming that negative
events trigger rejection in one sector, but not in the other.
3.1 Discrimination of high-skilled workers
When only high skilled workers are discriminated against, dh > 0; dl = 0, wages
received by natives and immigrants with low productivity will be identical,
wNl = w
I
l = yl
++fl
(+)2+fl
, labour market tightness in the low productivity sector
is determined by k1 l = yl= (2 (+ ) + fl (l)). The labour market tightness
condition for the high productivity sector is
gh = k
1 
h  h
(+ ) yh   flyl2(+)+fl
2 (+ ) (+ ) + fh
 (1  h)
(1  dh)

(+ ) yh   flyl2(+)+fl

2 (+ ) (+ ) + fh (1  dh) = 0;
(17)
where h =
1
1+
(1 n)
n
bcIbcN
. Discrimination of high skilled workers has a direct
negative impact on the labour market tightness for rms hiring skilled workers
and an indirect e¤ect via the training decision and the share of natives among the
unemployed workers. The negative impact on training for immigrants increases
the relative number of skilled natives in the economy, and therefore indirectly
increases labour market tightness. We di¤erentiate equation (17) and (14) for
immigrants when dl = 0, whereby we obtain the following results around dh =
dl = 0.
Proposition 1 When training is endogenously determined and discrimination
in the high skilled sector increases, dh increases, then fewer unemployed low
skilled workers train, dbcI=ddh < 0; dbcN=ddh < 0; and the impact on labour
market tightness facing the high skilled workers is negative, dh=ddh < 0. Con-
sequently, the high skilled workerswages fall and their unemployment rate in-
creases. Labour market tightness and thereby the unemployment rates facing low
10
skilled workers, which is identical for immigrants and natives, are una¤ected.
Higher discrimination facing high skilled workers has a direct negative im-
pact on labour market tightness for high skilled workers. Similarly, discrimi-
nation in the high skilled sector decreases the attractiveness of training such
that fewer immigrant workers train. The decrease in the fraction of trained im-
migrants will increase the fraction of natives among the skilled workers, which
tends to increase labour market tightness in the high skilled sector and there-
fore all skilled workerstransition rates. Around dh = dl = 0, the latter impact
vanishes and the total impact on labour market tightness in the high skilled
sector is negative. This, in turn, implies that also native low skilled workers
train less, dbcN=ddh < 0; but as they are not a¤ected directly by discrimination,
the negative impact on training is smaller for natives than for immigrants.
The reduction in labour market tightness facing skilled workers implies that
their wages fall. As immigrants are also directly negatively a¤ected, the negative
impact is stronger for immigrants than for natives.
High skilled immigrant workersunemployment rate is directly increased by
discrimination and indirectly a¤ected through the reduction in labour market
tightness for high skilled workers. Native high skilled workers experience a
smaller increase in unemployment as their unemployment rate is only a¤ected
by the reduced labour market tightness.
The proportion of skilled workers decreases for both natives and immigrants.
The impact is stronger for immigrants than for natives. This is the case, both
because nativesemployment chances are reduced less than those of the immi-
grants and thereby the risk of losing skills and because the negative impact on
training is lower for natives than for immigrants.
3.2 Discrimination of low-skilled workers
Even if discrimination is only present in the low productivity sector, dh = 0,
dl > 0, wages received by skilled natives and immigrants will di¤er, wJh =
yh((+)(+)+fh)+f
J
l
yl(+)
(+)2+fJ
l
(2(+)(+)+fh)
; J = N; I. This is due to the fact that the risk
of losing skills reduces the immigrant workersbargaining power further when
discrimination among low skilled workers is present. Hence, when considering
the impact on labour market tightness and training, we di¤erentiate the equa-
tions (14), J = N; I, and (8), s = h; l; when dh = 0 and dl > 0 to obtain results
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around dh = dl = 0.
Proposition 2 When training is endogenously determined and discrimination
in the low skilled sector increases, dl increases, then more low skilled unemployed
immigrants train, dbcI=ddl > 0; and the impact on labour market tightness in the
low skilled sector is negative, dl=ddl < 0, whereas it is positive in the high skilled
sector, dh=ddl > 0. Low skilled workers wages fall and their unemployment
rate increases. High skilled workers wages and unemployment rate fall and the
impact on the number of training unemployed natives is positive, dbcN=ddl > 0.
Discrimination among low skilled workers has a direct positive impact on
workerstraining and a direct negative impact on labour market tightness for
low skilled workers. It furthermore reduces wages facing high skilled workers,
because of the implied reduction of their bargaining power through the risk of
losing skills. This wage reduction, on the other hand, makes vacancy supply
more attractive for high skilled rms which increases labour market tightness
and thus high skilled workerstransition rate. Consequently, skilled nativesand
immigrantsunemployment rates fall.
Low skilled workers unemployment rate increases. For native low skilled
workers the reason is the fall in labour market tightness, whereas immigrant
workers furthermore experience a direct increase in unemployment from dis-
crimination.
Natives also train more as the improved employment chances of high skilled
workers and the worsened employment chances of low skilled employed, tend to
increase the number of low skilled natives training. The impact is modied by
the reduced wages. Immigrants being most negatively a¤ected by the increase in
discrimination, experience a larger increase in training than natives,
dbcI=ddl >dbcN=ddl.
The proportion of skilled workers increases. The impact is larger for immi-
grants than for natives. This is the case because the reduction in employment
chances as low skilled workers is smaller for natives than for immigrants and
also because the positive impact on training is larger for immigrants than for
natives.
One factor we have left out of our model is the fact that workers may regain
their skills while working in the low productivity sector. We incorporate this
possibility in the model by assuming exogenous training and on-the-job train-
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ing. We consider this in an alternative setting of the model after examining
simulations.
3.3 Simulations
In order to illustrate the results, we perform simulations. The following para-
meter values are used (annual values) in the solutions: the discount rate is set
to  = 0:08; the separation rate is set to  = 0:1 (see Millard and Mortensen
1997); the match e¢ ciency is assumed to be  = 0:5 (Pissarides 1995); yl is
normalized to one; yh is set equal to 1:3 to obtain a relatively large di¤er-
ence between productivity levels in the two sectors. The fraction of natives was
around n = 0:85 in Sweden in 2011 (www.scb.se). Hiring costs are assumed to be
k = 0:7 (70% of an annual low-skilled productivity):  = 0:27 is set to approxi-
mately match unemployment in Sweden in 2011, u = 0:076 (www.oecd.org), the
fact that the unemployment of natives was 37% of the unemployment of immi-
grants (www.scb.se) and that the fraction of long-term unemployed (more than
12 months) was 16:6% in 2010 (www.oecd.org). In our model, the long-term
unemployed workers correspond to the workers that have lost their skills.
In Appendix 3, we show the e¤ect of an increase in the level of discrimination
in one sector at a time, with training being endogenously determined at the
optimal level. In the rst(second) set of simulations, dh (dl) increases from 0
to 0:5; while dl (dh) is constant at 0:25. We simulate the e¤ects on wages,
rates of unemployment, skill shares and proportion of training workers, for the
four groups of workers: high-skilled natives (Nh), high-skilled immigrants (Ih),
low-skilled natives (Nl) and low-skilled immigrants (Il).
Increasing discrimination in the high-productivity sector mainly a¤ects skilled
immigrants: they receive lower wages and face higher unemployment. As a con-
sequence, the probability that a low-skilled immigrant chooses to train decreases
as does the share of skilled immigrants. When dh rises, the value of skills de-
creases for all workers, so less of them choose to train. When discrimination
increases, the risk that a vacancy is not lled rises, resulting in creation of fewer
vacancies in the high-productivity sector, until discrimination reaches a certain
level, see below. This means that skilled natives face changes in wages and
unemployment (leading to changes in skills and probability of training) in the
same direction as skilled immigrants, but of a much smaller magnitude. Instead
of training, low-skilled workers choose to work, accepting slightly lower wages,
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which tend to increase the vacancy supply.
The proportion of skilled workers among natives increases after dh = 0:35,
see graphs 3. This is the case as there a now so few immigrants among high
skilled workers, that the positive impact on vacancy supply through an increase
in h is dominating and vacancy supply increases in the high skilled sector.
Therefore skilled natives also faces lower unemployment after this discrimination
level and higher wages.
We then consider the second set of graphs. When discrimination increases in
the low-productivity sector, the e¤ect is stronger for low-skilled immigrants who
su¤er lower wages and higher unemployment. They have a strong incentive to
leave this sector and will do so by training more, increasing the probability that
an immigrant trains and the share of skilled immigrants. Low-skilled natives
also face lower wages and higher unemployment, but the impact is much weaker
for them, and so is the positive e¤ect on training and skills. Skilled workers
acknowledging that the conditions in the low-skilled sector have deteriorated,
accept lower wages in order to face lower unemployment and reduce the risk of
losing skills. The discrimination of low-skilled workers improves the employment
perspectives of all skilled workers.
The simulations show that when dl = 0 and dh = 0:25, immigrants choose to
train to a lower extent than natives. As dl increases, the value of skills increases
for all workers, but the e¤ect is much stronger for immigrants who choose to
train to an even larger extent.
In the simulations, if one fourth (one half) of the matches is a¤ected by
negative events, dh = dl = 0:25 (dh = dl = 0:5); immigrants obtain a wage
reduction of more than 3% (7%), while they su¤er more than 30% (90%) larger
unemployment than natives. In Sweden, immigrants have 11% lower wages8
and 128% higher unemployment9 than natives. In the USA, immigrants have
slightly lower unemployment than natives, but when considering discrimination,
this may be the wrong comparison. In the last quarter of 2007, Blacks or
African Americans had more than 20% lower median weekly earnings and more
than 100% higher unemployment than whites.10 We do acknowledge that these
8 In 2006, according to "Wages and Immigrant Occupational Composition in Sweden" by
Hansen, Wahlberg, Faisal, IZA DP No. 4823.
9 In 2007 according to the OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social
Statistics.
10According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in http://www.bls.gov/cps/.
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di¤erences can be explained by many other factors than discrimination which
are absent in the present model.
4 Exogenous Training
We maintain the assumptions from section 2, except that workers may regain
skills in two di¤erent ways: i) they get a low-productivity job and regain their
skills at the exogenous rate a or ii) they train while unemployed and regain their
skills at the exogenous rate . The exogenous probabilities a and  are common
knowledge and identical for natives and immigrants. The matching process is
as above.
4.1 Workers
The present discounted value, PDV, of the unemployed skilled worker i of origin
J = N; I (natives or immigrants) is given by eq (1), while the PDV of the
unemployed low skilled worker is now given by
UJil = f
J
il
 
W Jil   UJil

+ 
 
UJih   UJil

; J = N; I: (18)
The worker i gets a job in the low-productivity sector with probability per
unit of time fJl ; and regains skills by training while unemployed at the rate :
All parameters are common knowledge.
The present discounted value for the employed worker i;W Jis; s = h; l satises
equation (3) in the high productivity sector, while in the low productivity sector
it is given by:
W Jil = w
J
l + 
 
aUJih + (1  a)UJil  W Jil

; (19)
We assume that a proportion a of the workers regains skills and joins the
pool of skilled unemployed. For simplicity, we assume that regaining skills and
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job separation take place at the same time.1112
4.2 Firms
The present discounted value of a new vacancy in sector s is given by eq (6), the
PDV of a job occupied by a worker of origin J; XJs satises eq (7) and labour
market tightness, s s = h; l is determined by eq (8) as in section 2.
4.3 Equilibrium
Wages are determined by Nash Bargaining with a bargaining power equal to
one half, so that they are set to equalize the partiessurplus, W Js   UJs = XJs .
After substituting, this equalization implies :
wJh =
1
2
 
yh + U
J
ih

; J = N; I; (20)
wJl =
1
2

yl + f
J
l
 
W Jil   UJil

+ (   a)  UJih   UJil : (21)
The wage of a low-skilled worker decreases with a; the proportion by which he
or she regains skills with on-the-job training. This possibility makes employment
more attractive, so the worker accepts a lower wage in the bargaining process.
We assume that the exogenous rates at which all workers regain skills by training
while unemployed is equal to the rate by which they regain skills while working,
 = a: This simplifying assumption implies that the wages of low-skill workers
are independent of the transition rates in the high-productivity sector and allow
us to obtain analytical results.13
11This same assumption is present in Larsen (2001). As job separation is exogenous, it does
not need to be optimal to quit. However, workers would always quit when they regain their
skills if the value of being a high-productivity unemployed worker is higher than the value
of being an employed low-skilled worker. A su¢ cient condition requires that the di¤erence
in productivities is su¢ ciently large

yh  (+5:5)4:5 yl

; and the risk of losing skills is not
too high (+ (2  a) + 0:75    ) and the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers is
not too high (uh < 0:10). See Appendix 1b for details. These conditions are satised in the
simulations below as long as ds is not too high (close to 0.5).
12As a robustness test, we also examined the possibility that workers may search on the
job. In the model extended with search on the job for low-skilled workers (it would never be
optimal for high-skilled workers to search on the job as they cannot receive higher wages),
wages received by low-skilled workers will be further reduced, as low-skilled workers become
even more eager to obtain a job, due to the fact that the potential gain increases. Details are
available upon request.
13We describe the consequences of relaxing this assumption below.
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Unemployment rates for the four groups of workers are still given by (13)
whereas the proportion of native workers among the unemployed is changes to
h =
1
1+
(1 n)
n 
; l =
1
1+
(1 n)
n
(+fl)
(+fl(1 dl))

; where  = +a(fh+)+a(fh(1 dh)+) > 1: As
above, the additional negative impact of discrimination on low-skilled immigrant
workers results in relatively more natives among the skilled unemployed, h >
l.
By inserting the PDV from eq. (1)-(19) in eq. (20) and (21), we obtain:
wJl =
+  + fJl
2 (+ ) + fJl
yl J = N; I; (22)
wJh =

(+ ) (+ + ) + (+ ) fJh

yh + f
J
l
+
2(+)+fJl
yl
2 (+ ) (+ + ) + (+ ) fJh
: (23)
Native workers receive higher wages than immigrants in both sectors, wNs >
wIs ; s = h; l as f
N
s > f
I
s : Skilled natives receive higher wages than skilled
immigrants as they have a higher transition rate out of unemployment than
skilled immigrants and thereby a better bargaining position. And nally, skilled
workers receive higher wages than low-skilled workers, wJh > w
J
l ; J = N; I if
fh > fl.
Equations (22) and (23), together with equation (8), determine labour mar-
ket tightness for the two sectors. The labour market tightness facing skilled
workers is higher than that facing low-skilled workers, h > l, if the produc-
tivity di¤erence is su¢ ciently large or if there is more discrimination in the
low-productivity sector, dh  dl. This implies that it is easier for a skilled
worker than for a low-skilled worker to nd a job, fh > fl. If we relax the
simplifying assumption so that  > a; the low-skilled workersoutside option
improves raising their wages, as the probability of regaining skills is higher while
unemployed. The opposite holds if  < a.
Proposition 3 Due to discrimination in sector h, the proportion of low-skilled
immigrants is higher than the proportion of low-skilled natives in the economy.
Proof. The proportion of high skilled workers is, respectively,
Ih + e
I
h
1  n =
a ( + fh (1  dh))
+ a (fh (1  dh) + ) ;
Nh + e
N
h
n
=
a ( + fh)
(+ a (fh + ))
;
where we observe that 
Ih + e
I
h

= (1  n) <  Nh + eNh  =n;  Il + eIl  = (1  n) >  Nl + eNl  =n:
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Natives and immigrants enter the economy with the same distribution of
skills, but immigrants become less skilled due to discrimination in sector h:14
5 Higher Discrimination - Exogenous training
We assume again discrimination to be present in one sector at a time to improve
the transparency of the intuition.
5.1 Discrimination of high-skilled workers
Due to the simplifying assumption ( = a) ; discrimination in the high-productivity
sector has no e¤ect on wages in the low-productivity sector. Furthermore, the
proportion of natives among the unemployed is the same for skilled and non-
skilled workers, that is, h = l; as low-skilled immigrants are only indirectly
a¤ected by discrimination in sector h. We assume that productivity di¤erences
are su¢ ciently large to insure that fh (1  dh) > fl.
Proposition 4 All wages in the high-productivity sector decrease whenever dh
increases. The wages of low-skilled workers are una¤ected.
Higher discrimination directly reduces skilled immigrants wages as their
bargaining position deteriorates. Higher discrimination indirectly reduces the
transition rate faced by all skilled workers, even natives, and thereby their wages.
Proposition 5 The unemployment of all skilled workers goes up when dh in-
creases. Unemployment of low-skilled workers is una¤ected.
The direct e¤ect of higher discrimination is that more skilled immigrants
become unemployed and risk losing their skills. Furthermore, higher discrimi-
nation increases the expected duration of a vacancy and thereby causes a reduc-
tion in vacancy supply. This is the indirect e¤ect of discrimination. Higher dis-
crimination therefore lowers the transition rates into employment for all skilled
workers whereby unemployment increases. Discrimination implies that natives
are overrepresented among skilled workers and more a¤ected by the negative
indirect e¤ect. 15
14This result is independent of whether we have discrimination of low-skilled workers because
of the simplifying assumption  = a:
15The model may resemble Bergmanns model on occupational crowding (Bergmann 1971),
as a larger segment of immigrants than natives are "crowded" into the lower tier of the
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5.2 Discrimination of low-skilled workers
All workers are a¤ected both in terms of wages and unemployment.
Proposition 6 All wages fall whenever dl increases.
Proposition 7 When dl increases, unemployment of skilled workers falls and
unemployment of low-skilled workers increases.
Low-skilled immigrants su¤er from both the direct and the indirect e¤ect
of discrimination, while low-skilled natives only su¤er from the indirect e¤ect.
Hence, all low-skilled workers face lower wages and higher unemployment.
The fall in low-skilled workerswages and transition rates worsens the outside
option for all skilled workers, due to the risk of losing skills. Skilled workers
bargaining position is then damaged and they accept lower wages. This makes
skilled workers more attractive and therefore, more vacancies are opened in this
sector, thus reducing unemployment. Wages rise due to more vacancies, but
this e¤ect is smaller than the original wage reduction. Hence, the existence
of discrimination in the low-productivity sector provides a positive employment
externality on the high-productivity sector; it actually improves the employment
perspectives of all skilled workers.
5.3 More Immigrants
In this subsection we consider the impact on labour market performance from
an increase in the share of immigrants in the economy. We let the share of
immigrants increase with the total work force still being normalized to one and
let discrimination be present in one sector at a time.
Proposition 8 When the share of immigrants, 1 n, increases, in an economy
where only skilled immigrants are discriminated against, all skilled wages fall.
Wages received by low-skilled workers remain unchanged.
Proposition 9 When the share of immigrants increases in an economy where
dh > 0 and dl = 0, the unemployment rate of all skilled workers increases. The
labour market. On the other hand, in our set-up, not only immigrants but all workers in the
economy are a¤ected by discrimination. This result is also obtained in papers like Ortega
(2000). However, he does not consider the direct negative impact on rmsvacancy supply
from discrimination.
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unemployment rate of skilled natives increases relatively more than that of skilled
immigrants. The unemployment of low-skilled workers remains unchanged.
When there is an increase in the share of immigrants, a high-productivity
rm is more likely to match with an immigrant. This increases the expected
duration of a vacancy, as discrimination implies that more immigrants is associ-
ated with a lower matching frequency. The attractiveness of opening a vacancy
falls. All high skilled workerswages fall as their bargaining position is weak-
ened. This reduction in wages increases the transition rates for skilled workers,
modifying the wage reduction. Low-skilled wages are una¤ected due to the
assumption that  = a.
Unemployment increases following the reduced vacancy supply. Skilled na-
tives work in the sector to a larger extent, whereby their unemployment rate
increases more than that of skilled immigrants, that is,
 
uIh=u
N
h

decreases.
Proposition 10 In an economy where only low-skilled immigrants are discrim-
inated against, a higher (1  n) reduces the wages received by all low-skilled
workers.
Proposition 11 When the share of immigrants, (1  n) ; increases in an econ-
omy with dh = 0 and dl > 0, the unemployment rates of all low-skilled workers
increase, while the unemployment rates of all skilled workers fall. The unemploy-
ment of low-skilled natives increases more than that of low-skilled immigrants.
An increase in the share of immigrants makes opening a vacancy in the low-
productivity sector less attractive, and the resulting fall in the transition rates of
low-skilled workers deteriorates their bargaining position, which causes them to
accept lower wages. Even skilled workers are induced to accept lower wages to
avoid unemployment and the risk of losing skills, but the lower wages themselves
lead to an increase in the transition rate that once more raises wages. The total
e¤ect on skilled workerswages is indeterminate.
Fewer vacancies increase unemployment of all low-skilled workers. As low-
skilled natives are employed to a higher extent, they su¤er a higher increase
in unemployment, whereby the relative unemployment rate for immigrant vs
native low-skilled workers
 
uIl =u
N
l

decreases.
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5.4 Simulations
In the simulations in Appendix 4, we let the parameters have the same values
as in Appendix 3. Furthermore, we assume that the probability that a worker
regains skills by training is exogenously given at I = N = a = 0:08 so that
we let a = 0:8 to approximately match unemployment in Sweden in 2010. We
then consider the impact on the endogenous variables from higher discrimination
in one sector at a time, when discrimination in the other sector is larger than
zero and given by ds = 0:25. Finally, we increase the share of immigrants in
a model with a xed level of discrimination at dh = dl = 0:25: Our numerical
solutions show that the e¤ect of an increase in the share of immigrants has a
much smaller order of magnitude than the e¤ect of an increase in discrimination.
In both cases, that is when training is exogenous and when it is endogenous,
all variables move in the direction indicated in section 5.3, but the changes are
very small.16
6 Welfare
We consider the model with exogenous training. We have shown that discrimi-
nation has a di¤erent impact on labour market performance depending on the
sector where it exists and in this section we consider how welfare is a¤ected.
We use a utilitarian welfare function, which is obtained by adding all in-
dividualsand rmssteady state ow values of welfare in both the high- and
the low-productivity sector. To disregard congestion externalities, we assume
that  = 1=2; that is we impose the traditional Hosios condition (Hosios 1990)
where the elasticity of the expected duration of a vacancy is equal to the bar-
gaining power of workers in a symmetric Nash bargaining situation. Using
the asset equations for workers and rms in the two sectors, imposing the
ow equilibrium conditions and considering the case of no discounting, i.e.,
! 0;17 we can write the welfare function as production minus vacancy costs,
16 In our example, an extreme increase in the share of immigrants, from 10% to 90%, means
that wages decrease by less than 1%, while the unemployment rates increase by less than 3%
(less than 0.01 percentage points) for all workers.
17We ignore discounting in order to compare di¤erent steady states without needing to
consider the adjustment process. This is common in the literature; see, for example, Engström
et al (2005).
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W = ehyh + elyl   hhk   llk which is equal to
W =
X
s=h;l
 
eNs + e
I
s

ys   

eNs +
eIs
1  ds

fsk

: (24)
Assuming risk neutral individuals, we ignore distributional issues and hence,
wages will not feature in the welfare function.
We now consider the impact on welfare resulting from an increase in dh as
compared to an increase in dl around dh = dl = 0 and obtain:
@W
@dh
=
deh
ddh
yh +
del
ddh
yl   

deh
ddh
+ eIh

fhk   eh
2fh
dh
ddh
   del
ddh
flk;
@W
@dl
=
deh
ddl
yh +
del
ddl
yl   deh
ddl
fhk   eh
2fh
dh
ddl
  

del
ddl
+ eIl

flk   el
2fl
dl
ddl
:
Discrimination in the high-productivity sector unambiguously reduces em-
ployment in sector h, which decreases welfare in that sector, even if reduced
hiring costs mitigate this e¤ect. In the low-productivity sector, the reduction in
labour market tightness tends to reduce employment of natives and immigrants.
When discrimination is present in the low-productivity sector, more diver-
gent e¤ects emerge. As labour market tightness in the high- productivity sector
increases, there is a general increase in employment, raising welfare in sector h
(once more slightly mitigated by increased hiring costs). The increased transi-
tion rate in sector h reduces the number of low-skilled workers, but the reduced
transition rate in sector l tends to decrease the number of employed low-skilled
natives and immigrants. Furthermore, discrimination of low-skilled immigrants
causes a direct negative impact on them. Once more, reduced hiring costs have
a smaller impact on welfare than the impact through employment.
Substituting for employment changes, wages and using labour market tight-
ness equations when  = 0 and dh = dl = 0 give
@W
@dh
=  e
N
h
n
2 (1  n)
( (+ ) 2 + fh)

yh (+ )   fl
2 + fl
yl

< 0; (25)
@W
@dl
=  e
N
l
n
2 (1  n)
2 + fl
yl < 0: (26)
Even though higher discrimination in the high-productivity sector directly
increases employment in the low-productivity sector, this impact is smaller than
the direct reduction in employment facing high-skilled workers. Discrimination
unambiguously reduces welfare. We can show the following:
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Proposition 12 The negative impact on welfare is more severe if discrimina-
tion is present in the high-productivity sector than if it is present in the low-
productivity sector, given the su¢ cient condition 23yh >

+ yl.
Proof. We substitute for employment and use the fact that for employment to
be larger than unemployment we need fl > ; and the result follows.
The su¢ cient condition for discrimination to harm welfare more when present
in sector h is satised when productivity di¤erences are su¢ ciently large and/or
the probability that the worker loses skills, , is relatively small compared to
the rate at which a worker becomes skilled by training during unemployment,
: The parameter values used in the simulations fulll this condition.
The intuition is the following. As productivity is higher in sector h than in
sector l; any negative impact on employment will cause a larger direct reduction
in welfare in the high-productivity sector than in the low-productivity sector.
However, as discrimination in sector h has a positive e¤ect on employment in the
low-productivity sector, the rate at which workers turn into low-skilled workers,
, must also be small relative to the rate at which workers regain skills through
training, . Otherwise, the pool of low-skilled workers may become so large that
discrimination harms welfare more in the low-productivity sector.
We compare the changes in welfare produced by an increase in discrimina-
tion in one sector at a time in the simulation of Section 4.2, initially having
dh = dl = 0. When we increase dh to 0:30, welfare is reduced by 0:6 percent.
Increasing dl to 0:30 hardly reduces welfare (it is only reduced by 0:07 percent).
Hence, the welfare reduction is much larger when discrimination increases in
the high-productivity sector. Allowing training to be endogenous, hurts welfare
further in the case where discrimination prevails in the high-productivity sec-
tor, as the skills of immigrants deteriorate even more. The opposite is true for
discrimination in the low-productivity sector.
7 Conclusion
We formulated a model of discrimination triggered by negative events within
a search and wage-bargaining setting, where workers are subject to the risk of
losing skills during an unemployment spell. We allowed low-skilled workers to
regain skills both through employment and by training while unemployed. We
endogenized skill-acquisition and considered a double e¤ect of discrimination, in
23
the sense that it a¤ects the skills of immigrants both through skill loss and its
repercussion on the decision to train. We analyzed how the economy responds to
higher discrimination facing high- and low-skilled workers and more immigrants.
We show that, due to discrimination, immigrants su¤er higher unemploy-
ment rates, despite receiving lower wages. Even when discrimination exists
only in one sector of the economy, its negative e¤ects will spread to all workers.
Discrimination in one sector reduces the wages of all workers and increases the
unemployment rate of natives in the same sector, but it actually improves the
employment perspectives in the other sector when discrimination is present in
the low productivity sector.
Endogenous training delivers a further impact on labour market perfor-
mance. Discrimination in the high skilled sector reduces the incentives to train
for low skilled workers, where the e¤ect is stronger for immigrants than for na-
tives. The vacancy supply in the high skilled sector falls, resulting in a further
reduction in the proportion of skilled workers in the economy. The negative
impact is more pronounced for immigrants than for natives.
Discrimination facing low skilled workers drives them to train more. Immi-
grants are a¤ected both by the direct e¤ect of discrimination and by the reduced
vacancy supply in the low skilled sector, while natives are only a¤ected through
the latter impact. As immigrants are more inuenced than natives, more low
skilled immigrants train in order to counteract the negative impact from dis-
crimination. We here obtain the result that discrimination of low skilled workers
implies a higher proportion of skilled immigrants than proportion of skilled na-
tives, even though more immigrants lose skills.
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Appendix 1a: Condition for values with
endogenous training
In this appendix we derive a condition for when rUh > rWl, that is, the value
of being a high skilled unemployed worker is higher than the value of being a
low skilled employed worker when training is endogenous. The value equations
are given by equations (1)-(4) which here are rewritten
 
+ fJh + 

UJih   fJhW Jih   UJil = 0; J = N; I; 
+ fJil

UJil   fJilW Jil = 0; J = N; I;
(+ )W Jih   UJih = wJh ; J = N; I;
(+ )W Jil   UJil = wJl ; J = N; I;
Giving the solution,
Uh =

 
+  + fJl

fJhwh +  ( + ) f
J
l wl
D
Wl =
 
+ fJl
  
( + )+ 
 
 + fJh + 

wl
D
where
D =
 
 + + fJl
  
( + )+ 
 
 + fJh + 

Hence the value of being high skilled unemployed is higher than the value of
being low skilled employed if

 
+  + fJl

fJhwh +  ( + ) f
J
l wl
>  
+ fJl
  
( + )+ 
 
 + fJh + 

wl
which is equal to 
+  + fJl

fJhwh
>
fJl
 
 + fJh + 

wl +
 
( + )+ 
 
 + fJh + 

wl
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We insert wages to obtain
fJh
yh
 
(+ ) (+ ) + fJh 
 
2 (+ ) (+ ) + fJh 
 + fJh fJl yl(+)(+)2+fl 2 (+ ) (+ ) + fJh 
>  
( + ) (+ ) + fJh

yl
2 (+ ) + fl
+
( + ) fJl yl
2 (+ ) + fJl
which give two su¢ cient conditions
1)
fh
 
2 (+ ) + fJl

2 (+ ) (+ ) + fJh 
yh > yl ()
fh (yh   yl) + fhyh + fh (2 + fl) yh > yl2 (+ ) (+ )
In case unemployment for the high productivity workers are below 10 per-
cent we have: =
 
 + fJh

< 110 () 9 < fJh and noting that (+)(2+fl) < 1
for unemployment smaller than employment, we obtain the su¢ cient condition
yh
yl
> (+)4:5 .
2) The second su¢ cient condition is
fJh  
2 (+ ) (+ ) + fJh 
 > 1()
4:5 >
2 (+ ) (+ )
(  ) ;
were we also have used that 9 < fJh .
Appendix 1b: Condition for values with
exogenous training
Now, we derive a condition for that value of being a high skilled unemployed
worker is higher than the value of being a low skilled employed worker when
training is exogenous. The value equations are given by equations (1),(18), and
(19), which here are rewritten as 
+ fJh + 

UJih   fJhW Jih   UJil = 0; J = N; I; 
+ fJil + 
J
i

UJil   fJilW Jil   Ji UJih = 0; J = N; I;
(+ )W Jih   UJih = wJh ; J = N; I;
(+ )W Jil   aUJih    (1  a)UJil = wJl ; J = N; I;
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Giving the solution, using  = a
Uh =
  
+  + fJl

+ (+ ) + fl

fJhwh + (+ )flwl
D
Wl =
 
 + + fJl

fhwh +
  
+ fJl
  
(+ ) ( + ) + fJh 

+ 
 
 + + fJh

wl
D
where
D =
 
+ fJl
  
( + ) (+ + ) + (+ ) fJh

+ 
 
(+ )
 
+ fJh + 

+  (+ )

Hence, the value of being high skilled unemployed is higher than the value
of being low skilled employed if rUh > rWl which is equal to 
+  + fJl

fJhwh >
  
+  + fJl + 

( + ) +
 
+  + fJl

fJh

wl
We insert wages to obtain 
2 (+ ) + fJl

fJh (yh   yl)  (+ ) (2 (+ + )) yl   (+ ) fJl yl

+ (+ )
 
fJh   fJl

yl + f
J
h  (1  a) yl
> 0
From that equation we obtain the su¢ cient condition: 
2 (+ ) + fJl
 
2 (+  + ) + fJl
fJh (yh   yl) > (+ ) yl
In case unemployment for the high productivity workers are below 10 percent
we have =
 
 + fJh

< 110 () 9 < fJh and for low productivity workers to
have unemployment below 40 percent gives =
 
 + fJl

< 0:4 () 1:5 < fJl .
Hence, the su¢ cient conditions can be reduced to: a) +(2  a)+0:51:5  
and b) 0:5fJh (yh   yl)  (+ ) yl using that for the unemployment rate below
10 percent we have fJh > 9 we have
yh  (+ 5)
4:5
yl:
Appendix 2: Endogenous Training: Pro-
portion of natives
In equilibrium, inows are equal to outows, The equilibrium ows characteriz-
ing the labour market for workers determining unemployment, employment and
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training workers, Nh ; 
I
h; 
N
l ; 
I
l e
N
l ,e
N
h and e
J
t and are given by: 
+ fJh

Jh = e
J
h + 
0eJt ;
 
fJl +
 
1  t^J Jl = Jh + eJl ; J = N; I
Jl
 
1  t^J = eJt ; eJh = fJh Jh ; J = N; I
eJl = f
J
l 
J
l ; J = N; I
eNl + e
N
h + 
N
h + 
N
l + e
N
t = n; e
I
l + e
I
h + 
I
h + 
I
l + e
I
t = 1  n;
which gives
Nh =
c^Jn 
c^J
 
0fJh +  (+ 0)

+ 0
 
 + fJl
 ; J = N; I;
Nl =
n 
c^J
 
0fJh +  (+ 0)

+ 0
 
 + fJl
 ; J = N; I;
which gives the unemployment rates in equation (13) and the proportion of
natives among unemployed high skilled and low skilled are, respectively:
h =
1
1 + 1 nn
c^I
c^N

l =
1
1 + 1 nn 
hence
h > l if
1  n
n
c^I
c^N
< 1
where  = (
c^N(0fh+(+))+0(+fl))
(c^I(0fh(1 dh)+(+))+0(+fl(1 dl))) .
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Appendix 3: Endogenous training
E¤ect of an " in dh and dl in an economy with endogenous training. The para-
meters assumed are:  = 0:7; yh = 1:30; yl = 1:00; k = 0:70;  = 0:10;  = 0:08;
n = 0:85;  = 0:27 and ds = 0:25 when constant.
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Appendix 4: Exogenous training
The e¤ect of an increase in dh (left) and dl (right) are shown in an economy
with exogenous training. The parameters assumed are: yh = 1:30; yl = 1:00;
k = 0:70;  = 0:10;  = 0:08; n = 0:85;  = 0:27;  = 0:08; a = 0:80:and
ds = 0:25 in the sector where it is constant.
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